Ethereum state data limit size
The answer is yes, Bitcoin can, in theory anyway. Infact, if one was to try to execute these types of smart contracts on Bitcoin then it must do rollups, because there is no way of making existing Bitcoin full nodes validate these complex smart contracts. Therefore, the only way of doing it would be to put the smart contract data on the Bitcoin blockchain, and have the smart contract transactions executed and validated by other node software, which runs the sidechain.
Technically you can argue that in order to be a real rollup, the layer 1 transaction must be able to enforce the layer 2 transactions, since on Bitcoin you cannot do this, perhaps it should not be called a rollup. However, on Bitcoin, with this type of sidechain construction you can still do almost anything, including making the system Ethereum Virtual Machine EVM capable with Solidity smart contracts.
Of course such a system may not be effective or efficient on top of Bitcoin, but in theory it could work. One weakness of creating this sidechain rollup type system on top of Bitcoin, is that unlike with Ethereum, you could never do the fraud proof, optimistic rollup type system.
However, it is not clear to us that this would be needed or desirable. The purpose of constructing these rollups on top of Bitcoin, would be to add Ethereum like smart contracting capability to Bitcoin. In contrast the purpose of rollups on Ethereum is higher capacity, not improved smart contracting capabilities. Therefore, in this theoretical Bitcoin construct, users can choose whether or not they want to validate the sidechain in addition to the mainchain or not, and the fraud proof system is not necessary.
In our view, this apparent sweet spot, where optimistic rollups make sense for Ethereum, may not last too long there anyway. Our above analysis ignores the issue about how to quickly and securely move non-custodial Bitcoin into and out of the smart contract enabled rollup sidechain, however we will leave this complex and challenging topic for another occasion.
This area may be another theoretical weakness Bitcoin has with respect to Ethereum, when building rollups and sidechains. Ethereum blocks therefore have two limits, the gas limit and the calldata limit. Block construction could now become more complicated, as block producers now have a multi-dimensional problem to consider when selecting revenue maximising transactions. This weakness was discussed in the EIP. This problem of two block constraints is far more simple than working out how to extract MEV when producing blocks, therefore it was argued that the two limits does not increase complexity for block producers.
However, we still think the two limits could add complexity for users and wallets, which need to decide on the fee or tip for their transactions. There is some more irony here, when comparing this to Bitcoin. Two fee market buckets was a criticism levied against the SegWit upgrade to Bitcoin in August We would appreciate feedback on this issue. EIP introduces a block gas limit target and a base fee. The base fee adjusts according to whether gas usage is above or below the target.
As far as we are aware, there is no adjustment mechanism for this new calldata limit. Therefore, if the calldata limit comes into play, which it may well do if rollups succeed, there could be fee market volatility again and the primary benefits of EIP could be lost. However, we could be wrong here and plan to conduct more research into this area. Conclusion Ethereum blocks are currently typically around 80KB in size or around 4MB in a ten minute time period.
However, the size of blocks has never been a significant issue when it comes to syncing an Ethereum node. However, this does not mean Bitcoin is harder to sync or validate than Ethereum. Ethereum is far harder to validate, it perhaps takes around 10x longer than Bitcoin on a comparable machine based on our recent experiences there is no perfect like for like comparison.
Our point is that with Ethereum, it has never been about the blocksize. If rollups gain in traction, which we think is quite likely, things could change. The difficulty in syncing an Ethereum node and a major force of centralisation could quickly become primarily about the blocksize. As for the complexity of two block limits and two fee buckets, this may be unnecessary and is something we think should be avoided. Perhaps one could consider a more simple solution, such as lowering the gas cost of a byte of calldate to 8 rather than 3.
Maybe as a temporary gapstop, the two limits are ok, as long as they are removed again later on. What we are convinced of however, is that optimistic rollups alone cannot solve Ethereum scaling, it will simply make blocks larger until their size is a new problem. There will need to be more technologies deployed to scale Ethereum, in what is becoming a monumental challenge.
The general principle is that nodes verifying blocks no longer need to store state. The witness would also prove the correctness of the new state root after processing the block. Instead, transaction senders would provide witnesses that block producers can aggregate, and would be responsible for storing portions of the state tree needed to generate witnesses for accounts that they care about Strong statelessness is a very "elegant" solution in that it completely moves responsibility to the users, though to maintain a good user experience in practice there would need to be some kind of protocol created to help maintain state for users that are not personally running nodes or that need to interact with some unexpected account.
The challenges with making such protocols are significant. State must be continually accessed in order to remain "active"; state that is untouched for a long time becomes "inactive" or "expired". There are many choices for the exact mechanic for how state can be renewed eg.
Hence, any action that creates new state objects or refreshes existing ones only burdens other nodes for a limited period of time, and not as is currently the case forever. Inactive state is, using the definition above, not part of the "state"; clients that want to process blocks, or create blocks, do not need to store inactive state. The general principle is that active state is treated as it is today, and inactive state is treated with the mechanisms described above for stateless clients.
A transaction resurrecting an expired state object is required to provide a proof or "witness" showing that the object actually is part of the inactive state. In order to be able to generate such proofs, users themselves would need to store and maintain at least the part of the inactive state that corresponds to inactive state objects that they care about. When to expire There are a few different approaches to determine when state gets expired. Having large amounts of state expire at regular discrete intervals ie.
ReGenesis also has these benefits, and it has interesting tradeoffs. A key benefit is easier expiry no need to walk through the tree and expire things one by one , a key downside is more variability in how much witness data needs to be provided depending on how far into an epoch you are.
Account-level vs storage-slot-level expiry State expiry logic can be done at the level of the account, or at the level of individual storage slots. At present is my strong preference to do it at the level of individual storage slots. This is because there are many contract accounts that have an unbounded number of storage slots, and where arbitrary users can come in and increase the number of storage slots that the contract is responsible for eg.
For an expiry scheme with account-level granularity to actually limit state size, the rent fee would need to be proportional or the time-to-live extension inversely proportional to the number of storage slots in a contract. If contracts do keep using storage slots, they would need to have their own logic to "evict" storage slots that their users are not paying for. Either path leads to a result equivalent to expiry at per-storage-slot granularity.
Removing from the tree vs retiring parts of the tree One technical dichotomy on which state expiry proposals differ is the "one tree" vs "two trees" divide. Essentially, do we maintain a single state tree as before, but simply mark parts of the state as expired, or do we explicitly remove expired state from the main state tree and move it to a separate tree or other data structure that contains only expired objects? But it has the flaw that it requires a tree structure that is capable of storing intermediate information in nodes in this way, and does not extend well to Verkle trees.
Additionally, it requires the additional primitive of Merkle proofs not just going down to leaf nodes, but also stopping at intermediate points to prove that a portion of the state is expired. The two-tree approach has the benefit that it works with state accumulators as they exist today in their pure form, without needing per-node metadata. It has the flaw of requiring somewhat deeper changes to the wider protocol to implement, and requiring an explicit procedure to expire part of the state so expiry is not automatic.
It also has the property that it does not carry a built-in solution to the resurrection conflict dilemma see the next section , requiring a choice of one of two approaches. Note also the in the two-tree case, the second tree need not be a literal tree. In fact, it is possible to have a design where a state object is resurrected by providing a Merkle proof pointing to the receipt when an object is expired together with some cryptographic proof proving that it has not been resurrected before or re-expired more recently.
The concept of a resurrection conflict is as follows. Suppose some account gets created at address A. That account is then expired. Then, a new account gets created at address A eg. Finally, a resurrection of the original account is attempted. What happens? There are a few possible solutions: 1. The main concern with 2 is that it removes the ability to easily have addresses that can be interacted with and even accumulate assets eg.
Unregistered addresses are important: any user that receives ETH for the first time is using an unregistered address. Note that EOAs do not solve this problem.
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The delay comes into play in single-user exits due to the possibility of fraudulent actions. For example, a channel participant may try to finalize the channel on Ethereum by submitting an older state update on-chain. As a countermeasure, state channels allow honest users to challenge invalid state updates by submitting the latest, valid state of the channel on-chain. State channels are designed such that newer, agreed-upon state updates trump older state updates. Once a peer triggers the on-chain dispute-resolution system, the other party is required to respond within a time limit called the challenge window.
This allows users to challenge the exit transaction, especially if the other party is applying a stale update. Whatever the case may be, channel users always have strong finality guarantees: if the state transition in their possession was signed by all members and is the most recent update, then it is of equal finality with a regular on-chain transaction.
They still have to challenge the other party on-chain, but the only possible outcome is finalizing the last valid state, which they hold. How do state channels interact with Ethereum? Although they exist as off-chain protocols, state channels have an on-chain component: the smart contract deployed on Ethereum when opening the channel.
This contract controls the assets deposited into the channel, verifies state updates, and arbitrates disputes between participants. State channels don't publish transaction data or state commitments to Mainnet, unlike layer 2 scaling solutions. However, they are more connected to Mainnet than, say, sidechains , making them somewhat safer.
State channels rely on the main Ethereum protocol for the following: 1. Liveness The on-chain contract deployed when opening the channel is responsible for the channel's functionality. If the contract is running on Ethereum, then the channel is always available for usage. Conversely, a sidechain can always fail, even if Mainnet is operational, putting user funds at risk.
Security To some extent, state channels rely on Ethereum to provide security and protect users from malicious peers. As discussed in later sections, channels use a fraud proof mechanism that lets users challenge attempts to finalize the channel with an invalid or stale update. In this case, the honest party provides the latest valid state of the channel as a fraud proof to the on-chain contract for verification.
Fraud proofs enable mutually distrustful parties to conduct off-chain transactions without risking their funds in the process. Finality State updates collectively signed by channel users are considered as good as on-chain transactions. Still, all in-channel activity only achieves true finality when the channel is closed on Ethereum. In the optimistic case, both parties can cooperate and sign the final state update and submit on-chain to close the channel, after which the funds are distributed according to the channel's final state.
In the pessimistic case, where someone tries to cheat by posting an incorrect state update on-chain, their transaction isn't finalized until the challenge window elapses. Virtual state channels The naive implementation of a state channel would be to deploy a new contract when two users wish to execute an application off-chain. This is not only infeasible, but it also negates the cost-effectiveness of state channels on-chain transaction costs can quickly add up.
To solve this problem, "virtual channels" were created. Unlike regular channels that require on-chain transactions to open and terminate, a virtual channel can be opened, executed, and finalized without interacting with the main chain. It is even possible to settle disputes off-chain using this method. This system relies on the existence of so-called "ledger channels", which have been funded on-chain. Virtual channels between two parties can be built on top of an existing ledger channel, with the owner s of the ledger channel serving as an intermediary.
Users in each virtual channel interact via a new contract instance, with the ledger channel able to support multiple contract instances. The ledger channel's state also contains more than one contract storage state, allowing for parallel execution of applications off-chain between different users.
Just like regular channels, users exchange state updates to progress the state machine. Except a dispute arises, the intermediary only has to be contacted when opening or terminating the channel. Virtual payment channels Virtual payment channels work off the same idea as virtual state channels: participants connected to the same network can pass messages without needing to open a new channel on-chain.
In virtual payment channels, value transfers are routed through one or more intermediaries, with guarantees that only the intended recipient can receive transferred funds. Applications of state channels Payments Early blockchain channels were simple protocols that allowed two participants to conduct rapid, low-fee transfers off-chain without having to pay high transaction fees on Mainnet.
Today, payment channels are still useful for applications designed for the exchange and deposits of ether and tokens. Channel-based payments have the following advantages: Throughput: The amount of off-chain transactions per channel is unconnected to Ethereum's throughput, which is influenced by various factors, especially block size and block time. By executing transactions off-chain, blockchain channels can achieve higher throughput.
Privacy: Because channels exist off-chain, details of interactions between participants are not recorded on Ethereum's public blockchain. Channel users only have to interact on-chain when funding and closing channels or settling disputes.
Thus, channels are useful for individuals who desire more private transactions. Latency: Off-chain transactions conducted between channel participants can be settled instantly, if both parties cooperate, reducing delays. In contrast, sending a transaction on Mainnet requires waiting for nodes to process the transaction, produce a new block with the transaction, and reach consensus. Users may also need to wait for more block confirmations before considering a transaction finalized.
Implementing state channels on layer 2 solutions, such as rollups , could make them even more attractive for payments. While channels offer cheap payments, the costs of setting up the on-chain contract on Mainnet during the opening phase can be get expensive—especially when gas fees spike.
Ethereum-based rollups offer lower transaction fees and can reduce overhead for channel participants by bringing down setup fees. Microtransactions Microtransactions are low-value payments e. These entities must pay payment service providers, which they cannot do if the margin on customer payments is too low to make a profit.
Payment channels solve this problem by reducing the overhead associated with microtransactions. For example, an Internet Service Provider ISP can open a payment channel with a customer, allowing them to stream small payments each time they use the service.
Beyond the cost of opening and closing the channel, participants don't incur further costs on microtransactions no gas fees. This is a win-win situation since customers have more flexibility in how much they pay for services and businesses don't lose out on profitable microtransactions. Decentralized applications Like payment channels, state channels can make conditional payments according to the state machine's final states.
State channels can also support arbitrary state transition logic, making them useful for executing generic apps off-chain. State channels are often limited to simple turn-based applications, as this makes it easier to manage funds committed to the on-chain contract. Also, with a limited number of parties updating the off-chain application's state at intervals, punishing dishonest behavior is relatively straightforward.
The efficiency of a state channel application also depends on its design. For example, a developer might deploy the app channel contract on-chain once and allow other players to re-use the app without having to go on-chain. In this case, the initial app channel serves as a ledger channel supporting multiple virtual channels, each running a new instance of the app's smart contract off-chain.
A potential use-case for state channel applications is simple two-player games, where funds are distributed based on the game's outcome. The benefit here is that players don't have to trust each other trustlessness and the on-chain contract, not players, controls the allocation of funds and settlement of disputes decentralization. Atomic transfers Early payment channels were restricted to transfers between two parties, limiting their usability.
However, the introduction of virtual channels allowed individuals to route transfers through intermediaries i. Commonly described as "multi-hop transfers", routed payments are atomic i. Atomic transfers use Hashed Timelock Contracts HTLCs to ensure the payment is released only if certain conditions are met, thereby reducing counterparty risk. Drawbacks of using state channels Liveness assumptions To ensure efficiency, state channels place time limits on the ability of channel participants to respond to disputes.
This rule assumes that peers will always be online to monitor channel activity and contest challenges when necessary. In reality, users can go offline for reasons out of their control e. If an honest user goes offline, a malicious peer can exploit the situation by presenting old intermediate states to the adjudicator contract and stealing the committed funds. Some channels use "watchtowers"—entities responsible for watching on-chain dispute events on behalf of others and taking necessary actions, like alerting concerned parties.
However, this can add to the costs of using a state channel. Data unavailability As explained earlier, challenging an invalid dispute requires presenting the latest, valid state of the state channel. This is another rule based on an assumption—that users have access to the channel's latest state.
Although expecting channel users to store copies of off-chain application state is reasonable, this data may be lost due to error or mechanical failure. If the user doesn't have the data backed up, they can only hope that the other party doesn't finalize an invalid exit request using old state transitions in their possession.
Ethereum users don't have to deal with this problem since the network enforces rules on data availability. Transaction data is stored and propagated by all nodes and available for users to download if and when necessary. Liquidity issues To establish a blockchain channel, participants need to lock funds in an on-chain smart contract for the channel's lifecycle.
This reduces the liquidity of channel users and also limits channels to those who can afford to keep funds locked on Mainnet. However, ledger channels—operated by an off-chain service provider OSP —can reduce liquidity issues for users. Two peers connected to a ledger channel can create a virtual channel, which they can open and finalize completely off-chain, anytime they want.
Off-chain service providers could also open channels with multiple peers, making them useful for routing payments. Of course, users must pay fees to OSPs for their services, which may be undesirable for some. This means blocks get chained together.
This is done to ensure that all participants on the Ethereum network maintain a synchronised state and agree to all transactions. This data in the chain of blocks cannot be changed without changing all subsequent blocks, which would require the entire consensus of the Ethereum network.
Ethereum uses a proof-of-work PoW consensus mechanism. In summary, when an ETH transaction occurs, the transaction must be mined and added to the new block. The updated state of this block is then shared with the entirety of the Ethereum network.
In recent times, the size of these Ethereum blocks have increased. See the 3 year chart below: As of right now, the average Ethereum block side is 86,
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Ethereum Scaling: The State Machine, $2500 Node Cost Target, Gas Limit \u0026 Layer-2The purpose of this proposal is to make the second layer Layer 2 expansion solution Rollups more economical and feasible.
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| Stocktwits ethereum | This is analogous with giving a real diamond new facets by literally cutting it. The first three items, however, are more tricky. TLDR: The block size limit. Libraries One simple way to move functionality code away from the storage is using a library. Except in rare cases, at any given time, all participants on the network are in agreement on the exact number and history of blocks, and are working to batch the current live transaction requests into the next block. Ethereum is used to build decentralized applications, a. |
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| Ethereum state data limit size | Mir validators are agnostic here: they are not required to store any account data, or to know where it is stored. To get a general idea of the pricing, I simulated a few Smart Contracts: I tried three operations: Writing a uint8 one byte in storage Incrementing a uint8 in the storage read then write A simple voting function, which checks whether the emitter of the transaction has the right to vote and then updates the vote result. However, we still believe that these two restrictions may increase the complexity of users and wallets because they need to determine the fees for their transactions. If Rollups improve, the situation may change. We carry out one or more transactions We get a new state: an updated set of accounts and their balances. |
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| Where is my btc address | Of course, these are estimations with different see more of magnitude. In other words, the Ethereum Software is a transaction processing system that works as follows: The system is in a certain state, i. The two most promising instances of this on Ethereum are optimistic and zero-knowledge rollups. Then you might want to really think about removing all but absolutely essential ones. As for the two block limits and the complexity of the fee market, a simpler solution may be considered, such as reducing the gas cost of a byte of transaction call data to 8 instead of 3. In theory, Ethereum enables infinite storage space. Then, a new account gets created at address A eg. |
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